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Abstract 
The literature on agendas with sincere and s trategic voting 
represents an important contribution to our unders tanding of committees, 
of ins titutions , and of the opportunities to manipulate outcomes by the 
manipulation of ins titutions . That literature , though , imposes an 
assumption that may be unrealistic in many situations ; namely, that 
everyone knows the preferences of everyon� else . In this essay we apply 
Bayesian equilibrium analysis to show that the properties of agendas that 
others derive assuming complete information do not hold necessarily under 
incomplete information. First ,  a Condorcet winner need not be selected, 
even if nearly everyone on the committee most prefers it. Second, the "2 
s tep theorem , "  that any outcome reachable in n voting s tages via some 
amendment agenda is reachable in two stages under sophisticated voting , 
need not hold. Third, nonbinding votes such as s traw polls , can 
critically effect final outcomes.  
* This research was supported by National Science Foundation grants to 
Carnegie-Mellon University and to the University o f  Texas at Austin. We 
also wish to acknowledge, in the case of one author ,  the support of 
Stanford' s  Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences . 
Agendas,  Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information 
Formal study of the idea that members of a committee might not vote 
sincerely in legislative ballot procedures was motivated by Farquharson's 
(1969) insight that voting is a strategy and that s trategies ought to be 
chosen carefully to attain preferred ends . Often, the best strategy is to 
vote insincerely , to misrepresent one's preference in early ballots to 
eliminate alternatives that would otherwise defeat preferred outcomes in 
later ballots , The result that bes t  summarizes the research stimulated by 
Farquharson's ins ight in the context of voting procedures in which a 
committee incrementally narrows the set of possible decisions by 
seque ntial pairwise voting (called binary procedures ) ,  is: Any motion 
that defeats something can prevail in some agenda if everyone votes 
sincerely - - if everyone fails to gauge the future consequences of their 
actions and instead votes at each s tage for the mos t  preferred of the two 
alternatives being considered.  But if a Condorcet winner exists, if there 
is an alternative on the agenda that defeats everything els e ,  then 
regardless of the details of the agenda , that winner is chosen if everyone 
votes strategically - - if everyone identifies the future consequences of 
their actions and votes throughout the agenda in accordance with an 
appropriate stra tegy (for a survey see Moulin, 1985 ) . 
Building o n  subsequent research by McKelvey and Niemi (1978 ) ,  Moulin 
(1979) , and Gretlein (1981) , which shows how working backwards up the 
extensive form representation of a voting procedure reduces a dynamic 
voting problem to o ne that is static , other results have been established 
for special types of binary agendas . For example , if everyone is 
strategic, then any amendment agenda any agenda in which the winner of 
one vote automatically' enters the voting in the next stage and the 
balloting proceeds until all alternatives are cons idered -- is equivalent 
to some two -stage agenda in the sense that if an alternative, o, can be 
reached via some amendment agenda from the status quo ,  p, then a can be  
reached from p in two votes (Miller, 1977 ) . And if 0 is  the set of  all 
alternatives in an amendment agenda, then a E 0 prevails only if a is 
uncovered in 0, which means that there isn't another alternative in O that 
defeats a and defeats everything that a defeats (Miller, 1978 , and for 
additional restrictions see Banks , 1985 ) .  With spatial preferences , 
maj ority rule , and s incere voting , if there is no Condorcet winner, then 
there is an amendment agenda that leads from any ini tial point , a, to any 
other point , P (McKelvey ,  1976,  1979) . The results about the uncovered
set ,  however, show that this implied power of agendas is reduced by 
s trategic voting (Miller,  1978,  and Shepsle and Weingast ,  1984) . 
Strategic voting in non- amendment agendas, including variants used in the 
U . S . Congress, have also been studied, with so�ewhat different results 
than those established for amendment agendas (Ordeshook and Schwartz , 
1986 ) .  Indeed,  even if all voters are strategic , we can construct binary 
agendas of a special sort ( sequential elimination agendas , in which 
balloting ends whenever an alternative is approved) that lead to any 
outcome in the top cycle set (Moulin,  1985) . 
Thus , we have a considerable literature that analyzes binary agendas 
in the contexts of sincere and s trategic voting. Nevertheless , this 
research suffers from a restriction that severely limits its 
applicability - - it supposes that people are completely informed about 
each other's preferences . Everyone knows everyone elses' preferences ,  
1 2 
everyone knows that everyone knows this , and therefore everyone knows when 
it is in the interest of others to be s trategically insincere . But even 
if the quality of information in committees sometimes approximates this 
assumption, a general theory of agendas must consider situations when 
information is incomplete . For example, the complex agendas that 
congressional rules admit (c . f .  Bach 1981) sugges t  that agendas serve 
purposes necessitated by incomplete information . Although the two-step 
reduction theorem is not always applicable because congress is not 
required to use an amendment agenda , multiple stage agendas seem 
needlessly complex under complete information. However,  with incomplete 
information , agendas do more than record votes in serial order :  members 
can use early ballots to mislead others about their intentions and 
preferences . 
Although the assumption of complete information is analytically 
convenient, it thus precludes consideration of important features of 
committee voting, including how legislators lea_rn about their colleagues'
preferences, when it is in the interest of those colleagues to disguise 
their preferences, and how legislators anticipate and respond to the 
s trategic revelation of preferences both in their voting and in the design 
and implementation of specific agendas . And it also precludes the 
pos s ibility of studying those formal and informal procedural details, such 
as straw votes , "position taking, " and pre - vote discussions, that 
committee members use either to estimate how others will vote or to effect 
how others will vote . 
This view of procedures in general and of agendas in particular 
compels us to revise the way in which agendas are analyzed. Previous 
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research views s trategic voting outcomes as a conj unction of strategies in 
which no person has an incentive to alter unilaterally his or her actions 
after the fact. That is, outcomes correspond to a (perfect) Nash 
equilibrium of voting strategies . But notice that with complete 
information , nothing can be learned as. the voting proceeds , because 
everyone is informed about the situation's relevant parameters ( the 
alternatives to be voted on, peoples' preferences o ver these alternatives, 
and the agenda) . Thus , everyone can map out everyone else'  s trategies, as 
well as their own, and deduce the equilibrium outcome. So the final 
outcome can be inferred beforehand, and the actual voting is the mere
recording of dominant s trategies . 
Another way to view this class ical approach is to notice that since 
peoples' beliefs about the preferences of others are fixed (everyone knows 
the truth) , there is no mention of beliefs in the s tatement of 
equilibrium , But with incomplete information, beliefs about preference can 
change as the voting proceeds . I f  I observe yo_u voting one way in some 
early stage of an agenda, I may infer one thing about your preferences, 
whereas if I observe a different choice, I may believe something else . 
And if I believe something different, then I may vote differently in 
subsequent ballots . Thus, voting serves a dual purpose, to affect outcomes 
via the selection and rej ection of outcomes at a particular s tage and to 
affect beliefs and , thus , future votes. In this world of incomplete 
information , the usual definitions of equilibrium must be augmented with 
conditions on the s tability and consistency of beliefs . S ince both 
strategies and beliefs can vary, an equilibrium in a world of incomplete 
information consists of a set of beliefs and strategies s uch that no one 
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has any incentive to change their strategies given their beliefs at any 
stage of the game and all beliefs are consistent with the strategies of 
other voters and prior assessments about their preferences . 
This essay , via several carefully selected examples , explores the 
implications of incomplete information in amendment agendas . Section 1 
outlines our basi c  approach, and provides the notation required for a 
definition of an appropriate equilibrium for binary voting games . Section 
2 illustrates the application of this equilibrium notion for a simple 
3 - alternative , 3 - voter , 2 -s tage amendment agenda . To show , however ,  how 
agendas with incomplete information differ from those with complete 
information , Section 3 offers an example in which a Condorcet winner is 
not selected : Although one alternative is almost certainly a Condorcet 
winner and thus i t  would be selected if information were complete , if 
information is incomplete , then it never corresponds to the equilibrium 
outcome for any symmetric pure strategy strategic voting equilibrium . 
Section 4 considers a 3 - s tage agenda. Three -s�age agendas permit us to 
explore the Bayes ian approach to signaling and the s trategic revelation of 
preferences . In addition, the likelihood of outcomes in this example 
cannot be matched by any two-stage agenda , which suggests that incomplete 
information provides at least a partial explanation for why lengthy 
agendas are sometimes observed . Section 5 extends the analy�is of agendas 
to include an initial communication stage (in this case a nonbinding straw 
vote ) . We s how how this can undo the Condorcet paradox that we construct 
in Section 3 .  
We emphasize that we offer no general theorems , and that our examples 
are " carefully selected" to illustrate a general theoretical approach. 
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Games with incomplete information are complex , and we are only beginning 
to learn how to treat the problems they pose; But our examples do more 
than simply illustrate an alternative concept of equilibrium . They also 
show why many of the conclusions about agenda manipulation deduced with 
complete information must be scrutinized and modified (even abandoned) 
when information is incomplete and endogenous . 
1 .  The Basic Approach 
The most useful approach to s tudying s trategic voting in binary 
agendas relies on extensive - form game theory . To represent this form and 
to develop an appropriate equilibrium concept for the corresponding 
noncooperative incomplete information game , let a committee , C ,  consist of 
n (odd) members , C - (1 , 2 ,  . . .  , n} ,  and let X be the set of all feasible 
outcomes.  The purpose of mos t  agendas , of course ,  is to winnow out 
alternatives until only one outcome in X remains . Suppose at stage s (s -
1 , 2 ,  . . .  ,k) of this process that only the outcomes x. remain feasible . 
Then in any binary agenda , the vote in stage s·
·
must be between two subsets 
of X8, say X! and X!, where the intersections of these two sets need not
be empty , but where these two subsets together exhaust all remaining 
possibilities (that is , X!uX! - X,). In general ,  the content of these two 
sets depend on the history of previous votes . Letting rir 
- (Y/�, • • •  , YI�)
identify how each member of C votes in s tage r,  then �he history up to 
stage s ,  hs - (ri1 , . . .  , ris - ll completely summarizes t
he outcomes of the
first s - 1  stages of the agenda , which we assume is common knowledge at 
s tage s.  Thus , we let X! and X! both be functions of hs .
Amendment agendas are a special case of binary agendas . The 
distinguishing assumption for them is that at any s tage s ,  X0-X! - (a(h,) J
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and x. -X� - (,8 s J , where er ( hs ) and ,8 s are two alternatives in X - -
specifically , cr(hs) corresponds to the winner of the previous ballot (and , 
hence , is a function of the history to s tage s) and .Bs is a prespecified
alternative introduced into the voting at stage s ,  independent of hs. The 
winner of this vote then enters the next round against the prespecified 
alternative , ,Bs+l 
e X! - (er, ,BJ . (Although we can define winning any
number of ways to admit ,  say , the chair ' s  power to veto decisions or to 
allow for weighted voting, we assume that something wins if it receives a 
maj ority of votes . )
Now , given an agenda and a committee , we mus t  define the associated 
extensive - form noncooperative game , since the analysis of it tells us how 
members vote at each s tage and the final outcome. First ,  we mus t  specify 
whether voting is by open or secret ballot. We assume that voting occurs 
in an open ballot setting , that all members know how every other member 
voted in earlier stages. We impose this assumption merely as a matter of 
convenience , though, since our results apply as long as committee members 
at least know how many votes each alternative received. Next , we complete 
the description of the extensive form by specifying the preferences of the 
members of C and the information each member has about his or her 
environment. With respect to preferences , we follow a standard procedure 
in game theory (c. f .  Myerson, 1983) by viewing each member ieC as being 
randomly drawn from a set, Ti , of possible " types. , "  Thus , the set of all
pos s ible realizations of committee environments is I - T1 xT 2 x . . .  xT n , and a 
specific committee environment is a vector, t ,  of member " types. "  Since 
we equate types with preference orders over the finite set X ,  I is finite . 
Let each ieC have a utility function ui : rixX � R that takes each type in
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Ti and outcome in X and defines a cardinal utility number .  Now suppos e 
that there is a common prior distribution over the possible types and 
denote the probability of environment teI. by q (t ) .  Thus , although the 
members of C may not know each other ' s  type , they all share the same prior 
probability as to what environment they confront. 
Even though our notation may be unfamiliar to readers unacquainted 
with Bayesian game- theoretic models , to this point our formal development 
follows the traditional approach, in which everyone knows everyone else ' s  
type. But here we suppose that although each person knows his own typ e ,  
ti , he only has probabilistic information about the remaining members of C 
(he is uncertain about the types of others ) .  To distinguish formally 
between the traditional approach to the s tudy of agendas and the approach 
we take here , notice that generally one ' s  knowledge of ti can be used to 
update q. Specifically , letting t_i denote a vector of types of all
persons except i ,  member i can establish the conditional distribution 
}:q (t : i.t i )
t.' eT 
-i -i 
We then have two alternative assumptions about information s tructure : 
Complete Information : All conditional probability distributions are 
degenerate. That is , for all i and all t, qt (t_i l ti) is  e ither 0 or 1 ,
and everyone ' s  types are common knowledge (i. e. , everyone knows 
everyone els�' s type , everyone knows this , etc) . 
Private Information :  The conditional distributions are not degenerate. 
Members of C are uncertain about the types of other members. In the 
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simplest model, knowledge of one ' s  own type provides no useful 
information about other member ' s  types , and we refer to such situations 
as independent private information . 
To study agendas in which information about types is private, we must 
apply concepts drawn from Bayesian equilibrium analysis . Recall that the 
plausibility of the Farquharson reduction method for identifying 
sophisticated voting strategies (as well as Mckelvey and Niemi ' s  backward 
reduction procedure) relies on the assumption that all players know the 
preferences of all other players and, hence , that everyone can predict the 
outcome of every ballot . But here , information is not complete and 
players may choose certain s trategies because they reveal one thing about 
their preferences while different s trategies reveal something else . And at 
the same time voters can learn about the preferences of others as the 
agenda unfolds . Hence , our equilibrium must consider not only strategies 
but what voters believe about others . 
The first s tep is to specify each voter ' s  strategies , so letting Hs 
be the set of all possible histories of votes up to s tage s ,  a pure s ­
s trategy for each player i i s  a function that takes each history, hs E H8, 
and each type ti E Ti and specifies a decision for i at s tage s of the 
agenda to either vote for X! <hs) or for X� (hs>· A strategy, then, is a
decis ion rule that maps types and histories at each s tage into vote 
choices . Formally, a pure strategy for voter i is a set of K functions, 
5i - (ol, ... ,o�), such that o!: HsxT i � lX! (hs ) ,X� (hs ) J . Because in
principle we want to allow mixed strategies, let the s trategy set Ii
denote the set of all probability distributions o ver pure s trategies, with 
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the typical element ai E Ii . Thus, in terms of the voting tr�e, a! ( h s , t 1) 
- p is interpreted thus : If voter i is a type ti and if the history of 
the first s - 1  s tages of the agenda is hs, then i votes for X! <hs ) with
probability pE [O,l ] . 
Finally , voters make their decisions based on their beliefs about 
other members of C .  Formally , the belief o f  iEC a t  s tage s ,  denoted b! , 
is a mapping from HsXTi into the set of probability distributions on T_i"
That is , conditional on the voting history up to stage s and on what i 
knows about himself (his own type) ,  b! denotes what i thinks is the 
likelihood that the remaining members of the committee have preferences 
that correspond to the various possibilities (alternative types) .  Because 
i is conditioning these beliefs on the voting history and because this 
his tory changes as the committee proceeds through the agenda, this 
notation anticipates beliefs that change . For a K -stage amendment agenda , 
let bi - (bl 0 • • •  , b ! b� ) denote i ' s  belief sequence , which we assume 
is consistent with Bayes ' s  rule about probabilities . 
We are now in a position to define an equilibrium appropriate to 
binary agendas . First, following Moulin [1979 ] and McKelvey and Niemi 
[1978 ] , we define a game ' s  dominance reduction by sequenti ally eliminating 
dominated s trategies . Notice that even the first stage of this elimination 
process leaves us with a great.ly simplified game : Because on any final
s tage of an agenda, no person s hould vote for their second choice between 
the two remaining alternatives , all s trategies that admit a positive 
probability of such a decision are dominated. If player i ' s  s trategies are 
thus reduced Il c I i , we can apply this reduction procedure to Ii to yield
I�. and so forth until no further reduction is po�slble . The product of
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this reduction procedure , though, demonstrates the clear difference 
between agendas with complete and incomplete information . We know that 
with complete information and with s trict preferences , this reduction 
continues until each member of C is left with s trategy choices that are 
equivalent in the sense that they all yield the same , unique outcome, the 
sophisticated voting equilibrium. At this point the game is solved and 
there is no s trategic ambiguity. But with incomplete information this 
procedure does not result in unambiguous s trategy choices for all voters , 
and thus , it does not solve the game, 
To refine our predictions, let r' be the binary voting game that 
results from r after all dominated s trategies are successively eliminated .  
S ince voters may have more than one s trategy i n  r•, we must apply an 
equilibrium notion that is weaker than dominance solvability . We use 
Kreps and Wilson ' s  (1982 )  sequential equilibrium, which, when applied to 
the reduced gamer•, we call a strategic voting equilibrium (SVE) . 
Briefly , in a sequential equilibrium the part o
_
f each player ' s  strategy
that remains at any point from any given history , maximizes that player's 
expected utility over outcomes . The probabilities in these calculations 
use the player ' s  current beliefs and s trategy , where these beliefs are 
consistent with Bayesian probabilities and with an additional technical 
requirement . Rather than digress to a lengthy technical exposition , 
however, we turn now to our first example , which illustrates our 
definitions and the s tep.s that must be taken to analyze an incomplete
information agenda game . 
2. Illustrating a Strategic Voting Equilibrium 
Because we merely want to illustrate a method of solving incomplete 
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information agenda games and because nothing fundamentally changes with 
more elaborate possibilities (as ide from a cons iderable increase in 
analytic complexity) , we keep our example simple . Thus , we consider a 
situation in which there are only three voters , three alternatives , and 
three types of preferences . Suppose that the set of alternatives is 
(a,b , c),  in which case we can summarize preferences over three 
alternatives by two pieces of information : ( 1 )  the rank order of the 
alternatives,  and, letting the utility of the first and last ranked 
alternative be 1 and 0 respectively ,  ( 2 )  a utility number ve(O , l )  assigned 
to ·the middle ranked alternative (we assume throughout that all pref-
erences are s trict, so v must be less than 1 and greater than zero) . 
Suppose these three preference orders are possible: 
Preference Order Type : 1 
a 
b 
c 
2 
b 
c 
a 
3 
c 
a 
b 
u 
1 
v 
0 
Again , to keep the example simple, we assume that v is identical for all 
three voters , and that the prior probability that any voter has Type j 
preferences , qj• is common to all voters (the generalization of the
analysis with respect to these two assumptions is s traightforward . )  Next ,  
we assume the amendment agenda: "a vs b ,  the winner against c," which can 
be portrayed by the voting tree in Figure 1 .  The following remarks ass is t  
u s  i n  calculating an equilibrium for this voting game : 
Remark 1 :  In any binary procedure, everyone votes sincerely on the 
last ballot . Regardless of one ' s  beliefs , no s trategic purpose is served 
by misrepresenting preferences on the last vote . (This follows from the 
assumption that dominated strategies are eliminated from r.) 
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Remark 2 :  To verify that a particular strategy n- tuple is a SVE of a 
2 - stage agenda. we need only examine those cases in which a person's vote 
is critical for one alternative as against another, If your vote is 
irrelevant at any stage in the voting owing , say ,  to a unanimous choices 
by others , you cannot effect the outcome and , thus , any choice can be part 
of an equilibrium n- tuple, In deducing best response s trategies , then, we
condition probabilities on the decisiveness of a voter. Notice , though, 
that this remark applies only for 2 -s tage agendas such as the one shown in 
Figure 1 .  With more than two stages, voters may condition their beliefs 
in later s tages by margins of victory observed on previous ballots (see 
the example in Section 4) as well as by what wins or loses . 
Remark 3 :  Regardless of their beliefs. voters with Type 2 
preferences those who prefer b to c to a -- have voting s incerely on 
both ballots as a dominant s trategy. For voters of this type any lottery 
between b and c is preferred to any lottery between c and a. I f  both of 
the o ther voters vote for b over a or a over b,  any choice at this stage 
is an equilibrium choice since the voter is not pivotal (remark 2 ) . I f  
only one of the other voters chooses b over a ,  the voter in question 
cannot rej ect the hypothesis that there is some non- zero probability that 
b defeats c, in which case voting for b over a is referred, 
Remark 4: Type 3 voters -- those who prefer c to a and a to b -­
should also vote sincerely. There are two cases : ( i) neither of the 
remaining voters is a Type 3 ;  and (ii) at least one of the others is a 
Type 3 voter. Under case (i) , a type 3 voter prefers to end up with (a  vs 
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rather than (b vs c) since , in this last situation with everyone voting 
sincerely in the last stage (remark 1) b wins and b is this type ' s  las t 
choice, Under case (ii) , such a voter is indifferent between (a vs c) and 
(b vs c) since c always wins . Hence , voters of this type have a dominant 
strategy of voting for a on the first ballot as long as other voters abide 
by dominant strategies . Since there is some non-zero probability that 
case i prevails , type 3 ' s  are strictly better off voting for a. (Despite 
an obvious abuse of technical language , for convenience we refer to this 
strategy as "dominant" , )  
The numbers alongside the branches in Figure 1 summarize the s incere 
voting patterns described by Remarks 1 ,  3 and 4 .  Note that these remarks 
do not depend on the specification of prior beliefs (as long as qj > 0 for 
all j - 1,2,3 and ql + q2 + q3 - 1) or upon the choice of a von Neumann- ­
Morgenstern utility function to  represent preferences . Sincere voting for 
Type 2 and Type 3 voters is dominant (or nearly so) , given their ordinal 
preferences (regardless of v) . Hence, we assume that the "partial" 
s trategies described in Remarks 3 and 4 are used by all voters : If a voter 
has Type 2 or Type 3 preferences ,  then his voting decision necessarily 
follows these s trategies , and no further analysis is required for these 
two types, Correspondingly , each voter knows how others act if others 
have either of these two types of preferences . 
What remains is to identify the ti- strategy profiles - - a 
specification �f the first -stage strategy for each player when he has type 
1 preferences that yield a SVE . Limiting ourselves to pure ti-
s trategies, there are at leas t these two possibilities; 
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Case 1 :  All three voters vote sincerely when they have type 1 
preferences (all vote for a over b in stage 1 )  
Case 2 :  All three voters vote insincerely in stage 1 if they have 
type 1 preferences (they vote for b over a) 
In addition to these equilibria , which are symmetric in the sense that all 
voters of the same type are assumed to abide by identical strategies , we 
also have two nonsymmetric possibilities: 
Case 3 :  One of the voters votes s incerely (as in case 1 )  and the 
other two voters are insincere (as in case 2 ) . 
Case 4: Two of the voters vote sincerely (as in case 1) and one 
voter votes insincerely (as in case 2 ) . 
Again , to keep the example as simple as possible , we look only at the two 
symmetric cases ( see Ordeshook and Palfrey , 1985 , for the analysis of the 
nonsymmetric equilibria) . 
To s ee how we approach each case , consider the first .  Looking at the 
agenda from the perspective of a single voter , suppose this voter has Type 
1 preferences and , given the beliefs generated by his priors and his 
conj ecture that everyone else always votes sincerely , suppose that he 
concludes that his best response is to vote insincerely . Then the case 1 
s trategies , together with the appropriate set of beliefs cannot be an 
equilibrium , because equilibrium strategies are necessarily best 
responses . Hence , to establish that case 1 .corresponds to an SVE , we 
must show that if a Type 1 voter ' s  beliefs are derived from conj ectures 
corresponding from this case,  then his best response is to vote sincerely. 
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By symmetry , this will be sufficient to show that case 1 strategies are an 
SVE for r•. 
To check for the conditions under which a Type 1 voter , say voter i,  
who conj ectures that everyone is sincere , will indeed choose to vote 
sincerely, notice from Remark 2 that we need only compute best response 
strategies under the contingency that i is decisive on the first ballo t .  
Decisiveness requires that the other two voters split between voting for a 
and b. But if everyone is s incere , then the single other voter choosing b 
must be of Type 2 ,  and the single other voter choosing a is either of Type 
1 or 3 .  I f  i knew the "a  voter" is Type 1 ,  then i would vote sincerely , 
because with two Type 1 voters a defeats c on the second ballot and a is 
i's most preferred alternative . On the other hand , if i knew that the "a  
voter" was of Type 3 ,  then i would vote ( insincerely) for b s ince with one 
voter of each type a loses to c ,  but i ' s  second choice , b, defeats c. 
In deducing an optimal s trategy , then , the question is whether or not 
the "a voter" is Type 1 or Type 3, Given that he cannot be Type 2 ,  the 
Bayesian posterior probability that the "a voter" is a Type 1 voter is 
q1/(q1+q3) ,  and the posterior that he is a Type 3 voter is q3/(q1+q3) .
Thus , if i votes sincerely , i ' s expected payoff is 
l [q1/(q1+q3) ] + O [q3/(q1+q3) ] - q1/(q1+q3) .
On the other hand , if i votes insincerely, then he receives b with 
certainty s ince one other voter is known to be a Type 2 voter , and this 
voter and i will join to choose b over c in the second ( final)  ballo t .  
Since the utility i receives from b is v,  i t  follows that all voters 
voting sincerely is an equilibrium if 
( 1 . 1) 
That is , if expression (1. 1) holds , each voter's sincere voting s trategy 
is optimal given that voter ' s  correct conj ectures about the equilibrium 
strategies of others and beliefs that are consistent with these s trategies 
( i. e . ,  beliefs that are derived from q and o using Bayes ' s  rule ) . 
Reviewing the s teps in our analysis , they are : 
( 1 )  In accordance with the dominance reduction procedure , delete the 
dominated strategies of all players . For the present example, 
this requires that all types vote sincerely on the last ballot 
and that Types 2 and 3 vote sincerely on the first ballo t .  
( 2 )  For those types whose s trategies are not completely specified by 
s tep (1 )  - - Type 1 voters in the example -- identify the 
circumstance under which a voter of that type is decisive . 
( 3 )  Conj ecture a specific equilibrium strategy for all types whose 
strategies are not completely specified. In this instance, Case 
1 provides the conjecture . 
(4) Calculate the posterior beliefs (probabilities ) conditional on 
being decisive and on the circumstance of the hypothes ized 
equilibrium as described by (1 )  and ( 3 ) . 
( 5 )  Calculate the conditions under which the strategies hypothesized 
in ( 3 )  are in fact best responses to the assume s trategies of all 
other voters. This condition corresponds to expression ( 1. 1 ) .  
With these s teps in mind we can now turn to Case 2 t o  learn i f  other 
equilibria exist .  Suppose then that each voter conj ectures that other 
voters vote insincerely if they are Type 1 but vote sincerely otherwise , 
in accordance with Remarks 3 and 4 .  To establish an equilibrium we must 
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show that, given this belief, voting ins incerely is indeed a best response 
for a Type 1 voter . As before , we look only at those instances in which 
your vote is decisive; but now, given the conj ecture that Type 1 voters 
are s trategic and thus vote for b in the first ballot, the "a voter" must 
be of Type 3 .  Voter i's belief about the "b voter , "  given that such a 
voter cannot be a Type 3 ,  is that he is a Type 2 with posterior 
probability q2/(q1 + q2 ) and a Type 1 with posterior q1/(q1 + q2 ) .  I f  i 
votes insincerely ,  then b wins for sure since Types 1 and 2 both vote for 
b over c in the second round and since i knows , from the fact of being 
decisive on the first ballot, that at leas t  one voter is a Type 2 .  Stra­
tegic voting , then , yields the payoff v. But if i votes sincerely, a wins 
over c if the "b voter" is Type 1 whereas c wins if this voter is a Type 
2 .  Hence , i's expected utility from s incere voting is q1/(q1 + q2 ) • so
insincere voting for all Type 1 voters is an equilibrium if , 
( 1 .  2 )  
That is , if condition ( 1.2 ) holds, being insincere if you are a Type 1 
voter is optimal , given beliefs derived from Bayes's rule and the correct 
conj ecture that other Type 1 voters are insincere . 
Notice that conditions ( 1 . 1) and ( 1 . 2 )  have logical interpretations. 
First, if we hold v constant , then if ql is sufficiently large -- if  it is
likely that there is more than one Type 1 vo�er - - expression ( 1 . 1 )  s tates 
that voting s incerely is an equilibrium strategy for Type l's . This is 
only reasonable . because insincere voting helps i only if i is the only 
Type 1 voter . Indeed, intuition alone suggests that if the preferences of 
others are "similar" to yours , then sincere voting is generally a
reasonable s trategy . Condition ( 1 . 1) confirms this view. But in 
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addition , this condition adds an important qualification to this 
assumption: It is not the absolute magnitude of ql that dictates a choice 
of s trategy , but rather the relative magnitudes of ql and q3 . Thus , even 
if ql is quite small ,  sincere voting is an equilibrium as long as q3 is 
small as well . The reason for this , although less obvious , can be made 
intuitive . Because a voter' s decision has no effect unless he is pivotal , 
the probabilities relevant to his decision are conditionals , not 
marginals . That is , a Type 1 voter only needs to know the likelihood that 
alternative a wins in the second stage , conditional on his voting for it 
in the first stage and conditional on the actual vote split being 2 - to- l 
for a. Being pivotal in the first stage is the only circumstance under 
which a Type 1 voter affects the outcome , but voting for a is counter 
productive if the other "a voter" has too great a probabili�y of voting 
for c subsequently . And similar reasoning supplies the intuition behind 
expression ( 1 . 2 )  
Turning now to the role of the cardinal utility number v ,  recall that 
in the s tandard sophisticated voting model ,  results depend only on ordinal 
preferences, But since v measures preference intensity , the dependence of 
our results on v accords with the intuition that voting decisions 
themselves depend on preference intensity. Indeed , the dependence that 
expressions (1 . 1) and ( 1 . 2 )  reveal make sense . Firs t ,  as v increases , the 
relative preference between a voter' s first and second choice decreases, 
while the relative preference between the second and third ranked 
alternatives increases . Thus , if v is sufficiently large s o  that the 
inequality in (1 . 2 )  is satisfied, then a Type 1 voter "settles " for his 
second choice ,  b, rather than risking the possibility of having his least 
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preferred outcome , c ,  prevails as a result of voting sincerely for a. 
(Recall that in equilibrium , conditional on being pivotal in the firs t 
s tage , voting for b in the first stage guarantees b, but voting for a 
amounts to a gamble between a and c.) Analogously , if v is sufficiently 
small so that condition ( 1 . 1) is satisfied, then the gamble is worthwhile . 
The preceding discussion supplies the intuition behind expressions 
(1 . 1) and ( 1 . 2 ) , but notice in addition that these two conditions may be 
satisfied simultaneously if q2 > q3 , in which case there are two symmetric 
pure s trategy equilibria , where by " symmetric" we mean that either all 
Type 1 voters are sincere or all are strategic . On the other hand, it is 
also possible that neither ( 1 . 1) nor ( 1 . 2 )  is satisfied. In  this 
instance , either an equilibrium exists only in mixed strategies or the 
equilibrium is asymmetric. The appendix to this essay details the 
analysis of the two possible asymmetric equilibria involving pure 
s trategies , Cases 3 and 4, and shows that , depending on the q ' s  and v ,  
these asymmetric equilibria can exist as  wel l .  Indeed,  this multiplicity 
of equilibria is a common feature of games with incomplete information , 
and certainly many more kinds of equilibria may become possible if we 
admit mixed strategies or additional preference types . 
Our obj ective in this section, though , is to illustrate a method of 
analysis and to show that complete and incomplete information games yield 
qualitatively different conclusions . To see this difference more clearly 
with our example , suppose that (q1. q2 , q3 ) - ( 1/3 , 1/3 , 1/3 ) , in which
case expression (1 . 1) is satisfied if v < 1/2 and (1 . 2 )  is satisfied if v 
> 1/2 .  With these priors , then ,  s incere voting (Case 1) and insincere 
voting (Case 2) are equilibrium strategies for Type 1 voters , depending on 
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the intens ity of a type 1 voter' s. preferences for alternative b. Table 1 ,
now ,  compares for every possible preference profile the outcomes that 
prevail under complete information to the outcomes that prevail with 
incomplete information , for the two cases v < 1/2 and v > 1/2 .  
The numbers in this table yield several interesting comparisons . 
Firs t ,  notice that regardless of the value of v ,  it is never the case that 
the outcomes listed under complete information match , for all ten possible 
profiles , the outcomes prevailing with incomplete information . For 
example , then , if the q ' s  are the actual probabilities with which 
preference types are drawn and "assigned" to voters ,  and if this 
assignment is revealed before the voting to everyone (complete 
information) , then a and c will each prevail with probability 1/27 + 1/9 
+ 1/9 - 7/27 ,  and b with probability 13/27 .  But if this assignment is not 
revealed ( incomplete information) and if v < 1/2 , then a and b each 
prevail with probability 7/27 ,  and c prevails with probability 13/27. 
Similarly , if v > 1/2 , a cannot occur , b ' s  probability is 20/27 ,  and e' s 
is 7/27. Hence , with preference types assigned equiprobably in this 
fashion , neither the exact pattern of outcomes nor the a priori 
probability of outcomes under complete information will match the 
likelihood under incomplete information . While this is only an example , 
this conclusion is true generally , in the sense that either " exact" of " on 
average" matching of .complete and incomplete information outcomes is 
merely coincidental and not to be expected. 
The are also some interesting distributional consequences of 
incomplete information that Table 1 makes apparent. First, for any value 
of v ,  type 1 voters are the "victims " of incomplete information : for all 
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possible profiles ,  they are never better off and sometime they are worse 
of with incomplete as compared to complete information . Second, type 2 ' s  
are victims if v < 1/2 and "winners " if v > 1/2 , with the converse holding 
true for type 3 voters . Thus , perhaps not surprisingly incomplete 
information has distributional effects . 
Finally , the most striking disparity between complete and incomplete 
information in this. example occurs when v > 1/2 ( so  type, l ' s  vote 
insincerely) J!lli! type l ' s  are a maj ority (the first three profiles of the 
table) . In this instance ,  a is a Condorcet winner ,  but b is selected.  
Owing to the seeming paradoxical nature of this possibility, and to its 
profound consequence for the study of agendas , we examine it more closely 
in the next section . 
3 .  Condorcet Winners and Incomplete Information 
The previous example illustrates the nature of equilibrium with 
incomplete information , but it does not show fully how the assumptions we 
make about information alter the general conclusions that have been drawn 
about agendas . Again , because we want to keep the analysis as simple as 
possible , we consider the same agenda as before and the same three 
preference types . Rather than assume that there are only three voters , 
however,  we now assume that the number of .voters , n ,  is odd and exceeds
three . 
We begin the analysis by noticing that the same dominance reduction 
argument applies as before to Type 2 and Type 3 voters , which is to say 
that such types vote sincerely. Turning then to Type 1 voters and 
limiting the analysis to  symmetric pure strategy equilibria , the first 
possibility is that Type 1 voters all vote sincerely for a over b in the 
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first ballot . We claim that as n increases , these sincere strategies 
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium . To see this , consider a specific 
Type 1 voter.  As in the previous section , we only need to look at those 
cases in which this voter is decisive in the first vote (Remark 2) , in 
which case there must be exactly (n-1) /2 Type 2 voters (these are the only 
"b voters" for this case) . Hence , if this voter is decisive , then he can 
guarantee the outcome b by voting for b in the first stage , because he and 
the (n- 1)/2 Type 2 voters all vote for b over c in the second stage . On 
the other hand , if he votes for a in the first ballot , a is then paired 
against c and the outcome there depends on whether Type 1 voters are in 
the maj ority (since Type 2 and 3 voters choose c over a). Since we 
already know that there are (n-1)/2 Type 2 voters (recall that we 
condition on a Type 1 voter being pivotal in the first ballot) , a vote for 
a yields a only if J!1.l remaining voters are Type 1 .  That is , even if only 
one of the remaining voters has Type 3 preferences ,  voting for a in the 
firs t stage will ultimately yield c .  
Given that a randomly chosen " first ballot a-voter" cannot be a Type 
2 ,  the probability that he is a Type 1 (as against Type 3 )  is 
q1/ ( q3 + q1) .  Therefore , the probability that voting for a yields a when 
you are decisive on the first ballot equals the probability that all other 
" first ballot a -voters" are Type 1 voters , or 
[q1/(q3 + q1) J
(n-l )/2
This term is the probability that if a decisive Type 1 voter votes for a 
in the first stage , a ultimately wins . If the value of b to this voter is 
v, then he should vote for a over b in the first ballot only if , 
[q1/(q3 + q1) J
(n- l )/2 > v (2 . 1)
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But since v is strictly greater than zero, for sufficiently large n this 
inequality cannot hold for fill]'. strictly positive ql , q2 and q3· 
Therefore , all Type 1 voters voting sincerely for a over b cannot be a 
symmetric equilibrium for sufficiently large n regardless of the actual 
distribution of preferences across types . 
Now consider the second possible symmetric equilibrium: All Type 1 
voters strategically choose b over a on the first ballot . By similar 
reasoning , if a particular Type 1 voter is pivotal , there must be exactly 
(n- 1)/2 Type 3 voters . Hence , if decisive , a vote for b in the first 
ballot guarantees that b beats c in the second vote and that b is the 
outcome . But a vote for a results in c beating a in the second stage only 
if there are no Type 2 voters , which occurs with probability 
[q1/(q1 + q2 ) J
(n- l )/2
So Type 1 voters vote insincerely for b in the first ballot if and only 
if 
(2 . 2 ) 
For sufficiently large n ,  this inequality necessarily holds . Hence , for 
large n, the only symmetric pure strategy equilibrium is : In the first 
ballot , Type 1 and 2 voters choose b and Type 3 voters choose a; If b 
wins , Type 1 and 2 voters choose b, Type 3 voters choose c; If a wins , 
Type 2 and 3 voters choose c ,  Type 1 voters choose a .  
Notice that for large n ,  the qj ' s  approximate the actual proportions 
of voter types in the population, so  if ql + q2 > 1/2 ,  then b wins with 
almost certainty: Type 1 and 2 voters constitute a maj ority , and they are 
sufficient to pass A. But if q3 > 1/2 ,  then c wins with almost certainty . 
This shows that for sufficiently large n. regardless of priors. 
alternative a never prevails in a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium . 
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Since this is true for q1 arbitrarily close to 1 , this generates a range
of situations in which a is almost certainly a Condorcet winner , but the 
probability that a is selected is zero! 
We emphasize that by " sufficiently large n" we do not mean 
necessarily that our results apply only to very large committees . Suppose , 
for example , that the committee has only five members but that ql - , 9 ,  q2 
. 09 and q3 - . 01.  Hence , expressions (2 . 1) and ( 2 . 2 ) are both satisfied
and the only symmetric equilibria is when Type 2's vote strategically if 
[ . 9/ . 9 1]2 > v > [ . 9/ . 99 ] 2 or , equivalently, if . 98 > v > . 83 .  If the
committee has 9 members , the constraints on v expand to . 96 > v > . 69 .  
The question naturally arises as to whether this example illustrates 
a possibility that is generic to agenda games with incomplete information 
in that it is not a pathological consequence of the parameters we chos e .  
In.fac t ,  the example is robust in this sense .  First ,  the assumption that
only three preference order types are possible is not essential to the 
result .  For example , we could also assume that the remaining three orders 
have f-probability and that the priors on types 1, 2 and 3 are ql -'• q2 -'•
and q3 - '· The formal argument is naturally more complicated since we 
cannot reduce the problem to the strategic choices of only one preference 
type . Nevertheles s ,  the equilibrium strategies of the three primary types 
are the same as in our analysis if ' is small . Second , the result does 
not rely on certainty ( or symmetry) regarding v. Third , the implication 
of the example does not depend on there only being three alternatives - ­
although an analysis with more alternatives is considerably more complex 
- nor does it depend on the use of a binary amendment agendas . 
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4. Communication and Signalling: Three Voting Stages 
Deriving equilibria with incomplete information is complicated, both 
for the analyst and for committee members , because voters mus t 
simultaneously do two things: ( 1) secure the best possible outcome , and 
( 2 )  learn what outcomes �possible - - what outcomes can win . With 
complete information, both tasks are accomplished simultaneously by a 
backwards solution of the voting tree (McKelvey and Niemi, 1978 ) , but with 
incomplete information, the second task requires anticipating how others 
will vote , and to make accurate predictions requires learning as much as 
possible about the preferences of others and their anticipations of future 
votes . We might conj ecture , then ,  that one reason why we can secure a 
seemingly perverse outcome in the previous section is that in a two stage 
agenda , although voters form expectations in the first stage based on a 
combination of their priors and their conj ectures about the strategies of 
others , any revision of beliefs after the first ballot comes too late for 
voters to act on these revised beliefs: everyone votes sincerely on the 
second (last) ballot , regardless of what is learned from the first ballot . 
That is , there is no real communication or useful learning possible in a 
two- stage agenda . 
In this and the next sections we present an analysis of two different 
types of communication that correspond to important possibilities for 
signaling and learning . The first type arises when ,  with more than two
stages , early votes are used by committee members to convey information 
(or misinformation) that affects the decisions of other in later stages. 
The second type of communication, which we discuss in Section 5 ,  arises 
prior to the actual voting on the agenda , and is modeled here as a non-
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binding s traw vote . The first type illustrates the informational role of 
multistage agendas in committees , and the second type illustrates the role 
of procedural rules that permit non-binding acts such as straw votes or 
"pos ition taking . "  
Returning to the case of a three-person committee , we provide the 
opportunity for the communication of useful information by adding a s tage 
to the voting . Specifically , we suppose that the committee mus t  first 
choose between the agendas (a,c,b) and (b,c,a) , after which the 
appropriate agenda is implemented .  Figure 2 illustrates the corresponding 
voting tree . We proceed by supposing that preferences are restricted to 
the same three orders as in the previous examples . However , rather than 
describe all symmetric pure strategy equilibria as in Section 2 ,  we 
concentrate on the specific possibility that Figure 2 describes . The 
underlined numbers there alongside branches denote dominant choices for 
voters of that type ,  and the remaining numbers denote the specific 
conj ectured s trategies that are part of our example . The numbers in 
brackets indicate that if the agenda (a , c , b) is chosen by a vote margin of 
2 - to- l ,  then Type 3 voters vote for a whereas if the margin is 3 - to-O , 
then these voters choose c .  Given these conj ectures , we deduce the 
optimal strategies for voters of each type and check whether these 
s trategies and the conj ectured s trategies coincide, 
First ,  we must confirm that the underlined strategies in Figure 2 are 
dominant . Looking at the two subgames in Figure 2 that begin with the 
second vote - - the " left" subgame being the one in which (a,c,b) is the 
chosen agenda and the "right" subgame being the one in which (b,c,a) wins 
- - notice that in the left subgame , player 1 prefers any lottery between a 
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and b to  one between b and c. Hence, 1 voting for a in the first ballot 
of the agenda (a,c,b) is dominant . For a Type 2 voter, if no one else is 
a Type 2 voter, then choosing a yields the least preferred outcome (a)  
whereas choosing c yields c or b .  And if one or both of the other voters 
is also a Type 2 ,  then b prevails regardless of how you vote.  Hence , 
choosing c in the first ballot of the left subgame is sometimes better for 
a Type 2 voter and it is never worse than choosing a, Equivalent 
reasoning establishes the dominance of the s trategies as indicated in the 
right subgame of the voting tree . 
We assume as before that these dominant strategies as well as the 
conj ectured s trategies in Figure 2 are common knowledge , that any 
particular voter is of Type i with probability qi, and that the cardinal 
utility of the intermediate alternative is v .  For purposes o f  a specific 
numerical example , however ,  we also let v - . 6 ,  ql - . 1 , and q2 - q3 -
. 45 .  Our next step is t o  show that these numbers and the conj ectured 
strategies portrayed in Figure 2 are an equilib _rium . 
Consider the situation of a Type 2 voter in the right subgame, Notice 
that such a voter believes that the only way to reach this part of the 
agenda is if one or both of the other voters is of Type 1 .  If he  himself 
voted " left , "  there must be two Type 1 voters and a wins , regardless of 
what he does . But if he voted for the right subtree and the vote margin 
is 2 - 1, then there is only one Type 1 voter (the other "right" voter) . I f  
the third voter is a Type 2 like himself, then voting for c yields c ,  
whereas voting for b yields b .  But if the third voter is a Type 3 ,  then 
voting for c yields c as before , whereas voting for b yields a. Thus , a 
Type 2 voter ' s  choice at this node depends on how he evaluates "c with 
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certainty , "  which yields him v - .6, as agains t the lottery "b if the 
third voter is Type 2,  a if he is Type 3 . "  The conditional probability 
that a voter is of Type 2 ,  given that he cannot be of Type 1, is q2/(q2 + 
q3) .  Since this term is also the expected utility of the lottery 
resulting from a choice of b, a Type 2 voter will choose c if v � q2/(q2 + 
q3) - . 45/(. 45 + . 45 )  - . 5 .  This requirement is satisfied since v - . 6 ,  
s o  the strateg� depicted in Figure 2 is consistent with a Type 2 voter's 
beliefs and conj ectures whenever the agenda (b, c ,  a) wins , 
Now consider a Type 3's decision in the left subgame . If the initial 
margin of victory is 3 - 0 ,  then the voter in question believes that there 
are no Type 1 voters, s ince all such voters are conj ectured to choose the 
right subgame . In this event, from Figure 2, voting for c yields c in 
precisely the same circumstances as voting for a yields a .  Hence , voting 
for c, as conj ectured , is dominant . Suppos e ,  then , that the margin is 2 -
1 .  There are two possibilities: either the Type 3 voter in question (1)  
chooses the right subtree , or (2 )  he choose the left subtree, In case 
( 1) , he believes that there are no Type 1 voters, so the analysis proceeds 
as before, In case 2 there must be exactly one Type 1 voter, so voting 
for c yields c only if the third voter is also of Type 3 ,  which has a 
probability of q3/(q2 + q3) .  Voting for a ,  on the other hand yields a
with certainty . Thus , this voter chooses a over c if v � q3/(q2 + q3) ,  
which , in terms of the numbers in the example , requires that . 6  � . 5. 
This establishes that the conj ectured strategies for Type 3 voters in 
the left subgame and Type 2 voters in the right subgame are best responses 
given the parameters of the example , beliefs, and other conjectures . What 
remains is to show that the conj ectured decisions in the first ballot 
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correspond to those that Figure 2 indicates . Earlier we analyzed such 
votes assuming that the voter in question is decisive, but we must be 
careful here, because decisions can affect margins of victory and , thus , 
the decisions of Type 3 voters . That is , votes are signals , and voters 
might seek to manipulate those signals . 
With this strategic complication in mind, consider a Type 1 voter .  
If such a voter is pivotal in the first ballot or if b oth other voters 
vote " right," then voting "right" or " left" yields a .  But if the left 
subtree wins regardless of this voter's decision (if there are no other 
Type 1 voters ) , his decision depends on the margin of victory he prefers 
to convey . I f  he votes " left" he will induce Type 3 voters to choose c - ­
his least preferred alternative - - whereas if he choose s  " right" and 
signals a 2 - 1  vote , then Type 3 voters will choose a on the second ballot 
- - his most preferred alternative . Hence, his choice is to choose " right" 
and signal a 2 - 1  vote, which is what Figure 2 indicates . 
Next ,  consider the decision confronting a Type 2 voter in the first 
ballot . If such a voter is pivotal (i . e . ,  if there is precisely one Type 
1 voter) , then choosing " right" yields c ,  because he and the third voter. 
(who is either Type 2 or Type 3) will choose c on the next two ballots . 
Choosing " left , "  on the other hand , yields b if the third voter is of Type 
2 ,  and a otherwise. The lottery occasioned by choosing " left" is 
preferred to the certainty of c, and is therefore consistent with the 
conj ectured choice, if , 
'
v < 1 - [q3/ [q2 + q3 ) ]
2 ,
which is satis fied with the parameters of our example . Suppose now that 
there are no Type 1 voters, in which case " left" necessarily wins but the 
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ques tion becomes whether the Type 2 voter whose decision we are analyzing 
prefers to signal a 2 - 1  or a 3 -0  split . If one or both of the other voters 
is a Type 2 ,  then b prevails regardless of what s ignal he generates, 
because he and other Type 2 ' s  vote for c, then b. But if both are Type 
3 ' s ,  then a 3 - 0  split induces Type 3 ' s  to choose c whereas a 2 - 1  split 
induces both Type 3 ' s  to choose a, which gives a Type 2 his least 
preferred outcome . Hence , a Type 2 prefers to signal the 3 -0  split 
occasioned by voting " left" rather than a 2 - 1  split, which proves that the 
conj ectured strategy is consistent with the other features of the example . 
Our final task concerns the analysis of Type 3 voters , and here we 
must show that the expected utility of v?ting " left" exceeds that of 
voting "right . "  As before, if both of the other voters are of Type 1, it  
does not matter how a Type 3 voter votes . But if there is exactly one 
Type 1 voter , then choosing "right" yields c and a payoff of 1 with 
certainty : The voter in question plus the other non-Type 1 voter will 
choose c on the next two ballots . The probability that there is precisely 
one Type 1 voter among the other two voters is 2q1 (l -q1) - . 18 .  Now 
suppose that neither of the other two voters is Type 1 ,  in which case 
there are three possibili ties : both are Type 2 voters (probability . 452 ) ;
both are Type 3 voters (probability . 452 ) ;  and one is a Type 2 and the 
other is a Type 3 (probability 2 ( . 452) ) .  If both are Type 2, then b 
prevails and the voter in question receives 0 .  I f  both are Type 3 ,  they 
observe a 2 - 1  vote and choose a on the second and third ballots , and the 
voter in question realizes a payoff of .6 .  Finally, if  one is  Type 2 and 
the other is Type 3 ,  then the voter in question knows that he caused the 
2 - 1  split, and if  he votes for c, he and the other Type 3 will elect c on 
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the final ballot ,  for a payoff of 1 .  Hence , the expected util ity of 
voting "right" is 1 ( . 18 )  + 0( . 452 ) + . 6( . 452 ) + 1( 2 ( . 45 2 ) )  - . 7065 .
To compute the expected utility of voting " left , "  notice that if the 
initial vote is 3 - 0  because there are no Type 1 voters (probability . 92 ) ,
then other Type 3 ' s  will choose c on the second ballot and c will prevail 
unless both of the other voters are Type 2 (conditional probability . 52 ) .
So c prevails with probability . 92 (1 - . 52) - .6075 . I f  precisely one of
the other voters is a Type 1 (probability . 18 ) , then the voter in question 
should vote for a :  This yields a and a payoff o f  . 6  with certainty, as 
against an even chance lottery between c and b with expected payoff of . 5 ,  
depending on the type of the third voter, who is either Type 2 or Type 3 .  
Hence, the expected utility of choosing " left" is . 92 (1  - . 52 ) + .6( . 18 )
- . 7155, which shows , in accordance with the conj ectured s trategies in 
Figure 2 ,  that the expected utility of voting " left" exceeds that of 
voting "right . "  
This example reveals another important difference between incomplete 
and complete information agendas . Notice that with complete information , 
regardless of whether there are two or· three Type 3 voters and regardless 
of the 2 -s tage agenda used , c prevails . But with incomplete information , 
if there are two Type 3 ' s  and one Type 1 voter ,  then a prevails instead. 
In this instance , Type 3 ' s  key off the 2 - 1  vote signal and choose a rather 
than c .  This establishes directly that ,  contrary to the result under 
complete information that any outcome that can be reached in n s tages with 
an amendment agenda can be reached in two stages , our example induces a 
probability distribution over the outcomes that cannot be matched by any 
2 - s tage agenda , Our example also suggests that the rules governing the 
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precis ion with which the votes on earlier ballots are reported can affect 
equilibria . If a secret ballot permits announcement of the winner , but 
not its plurality, then Type 3 voters cannot key off the actual vote 
split ,  and the equilibrium will be different . 
5 .  Communication and Signaling: Straw Votes : 
Voting on an agenda provides an important signal , but we should not 
suppose from our example that only formal procedures and binding votes can 
perform this function. Consider straw votes , the existence of which 
seems , intuitively, to indicate that committees members are attempting to 
learn something about each others ' preferences prior to making the 
"actual" decision . We are accustomed, for example , to an endless parade 
of T . V .  Network polls of delegates prior to the actual balloting in the 
closely contested national party nominating conventions.. What we can 
show here is that such nonbinding votes are more than mere window 
dressing , that they can affect profoundly the outcomes that eventually 
prevail . 
Before proceeding, it is useful to reexamine the result obtained in 
Section 3 in which the unique symmetric pure strategy noncooperative 
outcome generally fails to correspond to the Condorcet winner . This event 
corresponds to an SVE , because no Type 1 voter is certain that his type is 
a maj ority in the committee even though ql is significantly greater than 
. 5 .  D4e to this uncertainty, the optimal decision criterion for such a 
voter is to condition his prior probabilities on being decisive , 
regardless of the likelihood of such a situation . Only if this situation 
is impossible , - only if the voter assigns a zero probability to the 
possibility of being pivotal - - is such conditioning unnecessary. Thus , 
it seems to be clearly in the interest of Type 1 voters to learn before 
the first ballot whether or not this unlikely event is possible . That is , 
it seems only reasonable to suppose that if Type 1 members are confronted 
with the agenda in Figure 1 and if they share the belief that ql is nearly 
one , then they should reduce the uncertainty beforehand with a s traw vote 
that signals how many voters there are of each type . 
To be certain that this argument is correct , consider the voting tree 
in Figure 3 ,  which represents the agenda (a , b , c) preceded by a nonbinding 
poll between a and b ,  Hence , regardless o f  the preference people reveal 
on the poll , the same agenda is implemented thereafter .  Consider now the 
following specification of strategies as a candidate for a symmetric 
equilibrium: 
All types are sincere in the straw poll and Type 2 and 3 voters are 
always sincere in the agenda . Type 1 voters are s incere in the 
agenda if the number indicating a preference for b in the pol l ,  r ,  is 
less than R* < (n -1 )/2 , whereas if r <!:: R*·, then Type 1 voters are 
insincere in the agenda ' s  first ballot . 
R* depends on the q ' s ,  v, and n in a manner to be deduced shortly . But to 
verify that this conj ecture is an SVE , let us consider first how a Type 1 
voter uses the information of the straw poll in deciding how to vote in 
the first ballot of the agenda . Notice that if r - (n- 1 ) /2 , a Type 1 
voter , i ,  is pivotal in the actual agenda , in which case the analysis in 
Section 3 tells us that for sufficiently large committees , i is insincere . 
If r > (n- 1 )/2 - - if the poll reveals that a maj ority of the committee are 
Type 2 voters - - then, by weak dominance ,  i should again be insincere . 
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But if r < (n- 1)/2 , i cannot be pivotal ; furthermore , i does not possess a 
dominant (weak or s trong) s trategy from this point on . Thus , we have some 
freedom in choosing voting decisions for Type 1 voters at this information 
set in constructing an equilibrium. For reasons that will become clear 
shortly , we let i vote s incerely if and only if r < R* � (n- 1 )/2 . 
To verify that there is an equilibrium of this sort , we must show 
that there exists some R* < (n- 1 )/2 such that each voter type prefers to 
vote sincerely in the s traw pol l ,  conditional on being pivotal in the 
pol l .  Beginning with Type 1 voters , notice that such a voter , i ,  is 
pivotal in the poll only in the event that r - R*- 1 ,  because then i can 
determine whether all other Type 1 voters choose sincerely or insincerely 
in the agenda . Naturally, i ' s  optimal strategy in the poll depends on how 
many Type 1 and 3 voters there are among the remaining n-r-1  who are 
revealed by the poll to not be Type 2 ' s .  First ,  if i is sincere , he gets a 
rather than c only if at least (n- 1)/2 of these voters are Type l ' s ;  
otherwise there are enough Type 3 '  s to j oin wi_th the r Type 2 '  s to yield
c .  The probability that there are a t  least (n- 1 )/2 Type l ' s  among these 
n -r - 1  voters is given by the following binomial expression (which also 
corresponds to the expected utility of being sincere since i ' s  utility 
from a is 1 and from c it is 0 ) : 
(4 . 1) 
But i f  i is insincere when p ivotal in the poll , then all Type l ' s  vote 
insincerely in the agenda ' s  first ballo t .  Thus , by being insincere when 
pivotal , c prevails unless the r Type 2 ' s  and the Type l ' s  among the 
remaining n-r voters are a maj ority .  If they are a maj ority ,  b prevails 
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and i gets v .  Since i knows that he is Type 1,  b prevails if (n- 1 )/2 - r 
or more of the "non-Type 2 voters" are Type l ' s .  Thus , the expected value 
of inducing insincerity is 
n-r-1 
v l: (4 . 2 )  
J • (n-1 ) /2-r 
Letting A denote the term after the summation , the requirement for sincere
voting in the straw poll , that expression (4 . 1) exceed ( 4 . 2 ) , becomes 
n-r-1 (n- 1 ) /2 n-r-1 
L A > v [ L A + L A (4 . 3 ) 
J • (n - 1 ) / 2 J•(n- 1 ) / 2-r J•(n- 1 ) /2  
If we set r - 0, then ( 4 , 3 )  is satisfied , because the term in brackets 
equals the left -most term, and 1 > v , But if we let r be as large as 
possible , (n- 1 )/2 - 1 ,  the inequality is more difficult to satisfy .  Indeed, 
if we set r - (n-1)/2 ,  which is the maximum value for R* , (4 . 3 ) is 
identical to ( 2 . 1 ) since the term in brackets is l ;  and we know that ( 2 . 1) 
cannot be satisfied for sufficiently large n .  From the monotonicity 
properties of each term as a function of r ,  th�n for ·  fixed q ' s ,  n ,  and v ,  
the maximum value of r for which the inequality i s  satisfied , say R* , lies 
in the interval (O , (n- 1 )/2 ) ) . This argument can also be used to establish 
that R* is unique . 
We must check, however ,  that R* does not become zero as n approaches 
infinity . This concern arises from the fact that our conclusion about 
Condorcet winners not prevailing depends to some extent on n .  We want to 
be certain that , regardless of n, the s traw poll solves the dilemma 
arising in the · example in Section 3 .  
Recall then that a s  n approaches infinity , the actual proportion of 
Type j voters approaches qj , j - 1 , 2 , 3 .  Recall also that if  ql < 1/2 , 
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then our Condorcet paradox does not arise ,  because a maj ority always 
prefers b to a .  So let ql > q3 • and consider the infinite sequence
( R* ) " N N•3 , N odd ' letting R* be any limit point of that sequenc e .  What we 
want to show is that if q1 > 1/2 ( i . e . , if a is always the Condorcet 
winner for large committees ) ,  then 
lim � /N - f* > ql (4 . 4) 
N ...., 
This inequality guarantees that in large committees , Type 1 voters never 
vote s trategically in the second s tage ( i . e . , with almost certainty , less 
than R* voters choose b in the straw poll) . 
To see that (4 . 4) is always satisfied for large n ,  notice that ql >
1/2 implies that q1/(q1+q3) > 1/2 , so that expression (4 . 2 )  converges to
v, because R;/N < 1/2 for all N .  Therefore , R* must have the property 
that (4 . 1) evaluated at � converges to v .  But this can only happen i f  
the probability that there are exactly (N-1)/2 Type 1 voters out o f  
N - R; - 1  Type 1 o r  Type 3 voters converges t o  1 .  That is , w e  must have , 
lim ( (N-R; - l)/(N- l) ] / (q1/(q1+q3) ] - 1/2 ,
N _,.,  
which implies that , 
lim R;/N - f* - ( q1 -q3 ) /2ql - 1/2 - q3/q1 .
N -+a>  
It  is now easily verified that if ql > 1/2 , then f* > q2 , which is what we 
wanted to show . 
The final s tep in the analysis is to show that Type 2 and Type 3 
voters should be s incere in the s traw poll . Firs t ,  if a Type 2 voter is 
pivotal in the poll ( i . e . , if there are precisely R*- 1  other Type 2 
voters ) ,  then voting sincerely induces Type l ' s  to be insincere . I f  Type 
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l ' s  and Type 2 ' s  are a maj ority ,  then b prevails , which is a Type 2 ' s  
ideal . Otherwise , c prevails . So a Type 2 always prefers to have Type 
l ' s  vote insincerely . If a Type 3 is pivotal , then being sincere induces 
Type l ' s  to be sincere and being insincere induces them to be insincere . 
If type 3 ' s  are a maj ority ,  then c prevails , regardless . But if this type 
is not a maj ority ,  then inducing s incerity yields a lottery between a and 
c (since Type 2 ' s  are not a maj ority either) whereas inducing insincerity 
causes Type 1 and 2 to vote alike , which leads to a Type 3 ' s  least 
preferred alternative , b .  Hence , whenever pivotal , Types 2 and 3 are 
sincere in the s traw vote . This establishes the equilibrium. 
The implication of expressions (4 . 1) - (4 . 3 ) can be made more 
intuitive by noticing that the critical value R* decreases as v increases , 
which means that a Type 1 voter can tolerate fewer "b voters " in the s traw 
poll before he attempts to induce ins incerity on the part of all Type 1 
voters in the binding portion of the agenda by voting insincerely in the 
pol l .  That is , as his second preference becomes more attractive , then , 
ceteris paribus , he is willing to entertain riskier lotteries to get this 
preference,  where these lotteries are riskier in the sense that there are 
fewer Type 2 voters wiliing to j oint Type l ' s  to secure b .  
We emphasize again that such conclusions pertain only to the specific 
conj ectured equilibrium, and there are certainly a great many other SVE ' s .  
Also , our arguments are no doubt sensitive to the preferences and to the 
number of alternative outcomes that the example admits . Nevertheles s ,  the 
example does show how a procedure that is purely informational , and thus 
irrelevant if information is complete - - in this case ,  a nonbinding poll 
- - becomes relevant if information is incomplete . 
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5 .  Conclusions 
Our intent is to present a new approach to the formal s tudy of 
agendas , an approach that is more promising for examining the role and 
importance of procedural rules in committees than traditional approaches 
that .require complete information. Although examples cannot be a last 
word on a theory , at least three conclusions are evident . First ,  voting 
with incomplete information in binary voting systems is significantly 
different than voting with complete information . With complete 
information , Condorcet winners necessarily prevail , but no such guarantee 
is poss ible with incomplete information . Furthermore , although we use an 
especially simple example to show this , the application of the methodology 
that we review would reveal that this example is robust (albie t ,  with a 
considerable increase in the complexity of the analysis) . Second , 
although s trict preferences guarantee a unique full information 
equilibrium outcome with traditional assumptions , there may be a 
multiplicity of equilibria outcomes if voters are imperfectly informed 
about the preferences of others . Third , we already know that the formal 
procedural structure of committees can influence outcomes profoundly , and 
the analytic approach presented here permits further refinements of this 
conclusion . Specifically , our examples reveal the importance in 
incomplete information environments of such institutional details as pre­
vote discussions , straw votes , and secret vs . open balloting . 
I t  is also clear that the analysis of agendas with incomplete 
information requires considerably more effort than with full information. 
There are a number of issues that should be addressed , but we cannot 
explore examples endlessly . Nevertheless , important lessons about the 
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role of information could be learned by arbitrarily assigning one voter 
the role of being the agenda setter and asking : What agenda should a 
setter choose given that his choice reveals something about his 
preferences? A setter must take such inferences into account before 
choosing , which , of course ,  makes the problem of setting agendas a more 
interesting strategic issue . Indeed, this suggestion only scratches the 
surface of the problems associated with analyzing the formation of 
agendas . For example , agendas often are formed sequentially in committee , 
in which case s trategies encompass decisions to second a motion , to 
introduce a new motion , when to introduce a motion , and when to move and 
to vote to terminate the process of adding motions to the agenda . Because 
informational and s trategic concerns interact in complex and subtle ways , 
our argument is that a framework such as the one presented here in which 
beliefs are endogenously determined is required to s tudy this class of 
problems realistically . 
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Preference Profile 
#T1 ' s  #T2 ' s  #T3 ' s
3 0 0 
2 1 0 
2 0 1 
1 2 0 
1 1 1 
1 0 2 
0 3 0 
0 2 1 
0 1 2 
0 0 3 
Table 1 
Probability Incomplete Info . Complete Info . 
of Profile v < 1/2 v > 1/2 
1/27 a b a 
1/9 a b a 
1/9 a b a 
1/9 b b b 
2/9 c b b 
1/9 c c c 
1/27 b b b 
1/9 b b b 
1/9 c c c 
1/27 c c c 
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